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Abstract
This chapter comments on that by Chris Fuchs on qBism. It
presents some mild criticisms of this view, some based on the EPR
and Wigner’s friend scenarios, and some based on the quantum theory
of measurement. A few alternative suggestions for implementing a sub-
jectivist interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics conclude
the chapter.
“M. Braque est un jeune homme fort audacieux. [...] Il me´prise la forme,
re´duit tout, sites et figures et maisons, a` des sche´mas ge´ome´triques, a` des
cubes. Ne le raillons point, puisqu’il est de bonne foi. Et attendons.”1 Thus
commented the French art critic Louis Vauxcelles on Braque’s first one-
man show in November 1908, thereby giving cubism its name. Substituting
spheres and tetrahedra for cubes might be more appropriate if one wishes to
apply the characterisation to qBism — the view of quantum mechanics and
the quantum state developed by Chris Fuchs and co-workers (for a general
reference see either the paper in this volume, or Fuchs (2010)). In this
note, I shall not comment on other possible analogies, nor shall I present
an exhaustive critical review of qBism (for an excellent one, see Timpson
∗Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, and Institut d’Histoire et de
Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS, Paris 1, ENS). Address for corre-
spondence: Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street,
Aberdeen AB24 3UB, Scotland, U.K. (e-mail: g.bacciagaluppi@abdn.ac.uk).
1“Mr Braque is a very bold young man. [...] He despises form, reduces everything,
places and figures and houses, to geometric schemes, to cubes. Let us not rail him, since
he is in good faith. And let us wait.” (My translation from Vauxcelles (1908).)
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(2008)). I simply wish to air a couple of worries I think qBists ought to
think about more, in a friendlier spirit than the one Braque and Picasso’s
paintings might have encountered one hundred years ago.
As was mentioned in discussion, qBism ought perhaps to stand not for
‘quantum Bayesianism’, for there are many kinds of Bayesians who would
not recognise themselves in it, but for ‘quantum Brunism’, after Bruno de
Finetti, who championed the radical subjectivist or pragmatist view of prob-
abilities. In Section 1, thus, I shall briefly remind the reader just how radical
this view is. In Section 2 I shall then express a number of worries about the
quantum case. Finally, Section 3 will give a quick sketch of some alternative
pragmatist options for interpreting quantum probabilities.2
1 Brunism, classical and quantum
First of all, what are subjective probabilites (aka credences), or what are
they for in a pragmatist understanding of probability? They are strategies
we adopt in order to navigate the world. Some may turn out to be more
useful than others in practice, but that does not change the fact that they
are subjective constructs.
Take for instance (classical) coin tossing. Subjective probabilities describe
our expectations for outcomes of succesive tosses (and guide our betting
behaviour). We start off with certain priors; these are updated as we go
along, reflecting past performance. But where do our original priors come
from? Let us dispel the idea that they stem from some intuitive feel or
mystic vision. They might, but they generally will not, and indeed need not.
Especially in more complex situations, we can and will adopt a theoretical
model to choose our priors. Such a model may involve a thorough analysis
of the whole set-up, or be even quite crude and just make use of simple
properties of the coin alone (e. g. weight distribution). In any case, it will
involve consideration of objective (but non-probabilistic!) properties of the
system under consideration.
2With the addition of Subsection 2.1, the material in this note was presented at the
Bertinoro conference. My thanks go to Maria Carla Galavotti, Roberta Campaner, Beat-
rice Collina and all the colleagues in the ESF network who organised the conference. But
most of all I wish to thank Chris Fuchs for the pleasure of endless discussions of quantum
Bayesianism over the years, and for removing the prejudice in my mind that a subjective
interpretation of quantum probabilities must be a non-starter.
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If the observed frequencies match the ones determined through the model,
it may be that the data ‘confirm’ our theoretical model. This, however,
does not mean that our strategy is any less subjective. Indeed, there is no
necessary connection between, say, weight distribution and relative frequen-
cies: for any possible sequence of results there is an initial condition that
will produce it, irrespective of the details of the weight distribution of the
coin. Nor is there for the ‘Brunist’ any compelling rational justification in
the sense of David Lewis (1971) for letting our credences depend on the
weight distribution, only pragmatic criteria such as simplicity, past perfor-
mance etc. ‘Confirmation’ is only a reflection of such past performance, and
bears no guarantee of future reliability.
One might object that de Finetti himself showed that if one’s priors for se-
quences of results are exchangeable, the posteriors will converge (with sub-
jective probability 1). This is surely a sign of tracking something ‘out there’
(or so the objection goes).3 As long as we are dealing with finite samples,
however, any apparent convergence of one’s probability assignments (one’s
own or intersubjectively) again merely reflects past performance. And the
expectation of future convergence depends crucially on the subjective as-
sumption of exchangeability. Exchangeability is an assumption about the
structure of one’s subjective priors, and is entirely independent of any ob-
jective behaviour of the system under consideration.
Even this more technical objection, thus, does not alter the fact that ac-
cording to de Finetti there is no sense in which our probability judgements
are right or wrong. As de Finetti very graphically expresses,
PROBABILITIES DO NOT EXIST.
The same is true in qBism. Quantum probabilities according to qBism
simply are subjective probabilities in the sense of de Finetti. They are
strategies that we adopt in navigating an (admittedly) unexpectedly strange
world. They may be impressively successful in terms of calculational power,
past performance etc., but that makes them no less subjective than the
theoretical models we might adopt for coin tossing (or indeed in classical
statistical mechanics!).
What may strike one as strange, or at least unfamiliar, is applying de
3Such a view seems to be suggested for instance by Greaves and Myrvold (2010).
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Finetti’s ideas to a case which is generally thought to be genuinely indeter-
ministic. There may be a price to pay if one does so, because if probabilities
are not objective, then any use of them in describing the observed regu-
larities in the world cannot be thought of as expressing law-like behaviour
in any necessary sense. But if one is happy with a broadly Humean view
of laws, this will not strike one as a disadvantage of the application of de
Finetti’s views to an indeterministic context.
Another point worth making explicitly (because it is not normally included
in presentations of qBism), is that even in the quantum case one may adopt
theoretical models for fixing one’s priors. For instance, one might use tech-
niques for selecting a Hamiltonian and calculating its ground state, and set
one’s subjective probabilities according to that. The data might then seem
to ‘confirm’ some particular choice of Hamiltonian. But according to the
qBist there will be no necessity or rationally compelling reasons for using it
to fix our credences, only pragmatic ones such as calculational power, past
performance etc.
Fuchs generally talks of quantum states themselves as subjective (and this
leads him also to a view of Hamiltonians as subjective). What I am say-
ing instead is that one can take Hamiltonians to be objective properties of
quantum systems, just like the weight distribution in a coin, and further as
non-probabilistic properties, again just like weight distribution. Indeed, one
can even think of quantum states (!) as objective properties of a system,
stripping them of their customary probabilistic elements, and thinking for
instance of the ground state ‘merely’ as a state of definite energy. (After all,
Heisenberg, Pauli, Schro¨dinger and others all had notions of quantum states
before Born introduced his ‘statistical’ interpretation of the wave function.4)
The probabilistic association would attach to such a state exclusively in the
way we use it to fix our credences. We shall return to the idea of objective
non-probabilistic quantum states in Section 3.
4When Schro¨dinger introduced his wave functions, he clearly understood them as rep-
resenting physical states of matter. But also Heisenberg and other advocates of matrix
mechanics had a notion of stationary state, both preceding and distinct from Schro¨dinger’s
wave functions. Cf. Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009, Ch. 3) and Bacciagaluppi (2008).
4
2 Worries
2.1 EPR and Wigner’s friend
One worry I wish to air about qBism relates to one of its reputed major
selling points, namely its ‘local’ account of ‘nonocal’ EPR correlations. The
qBist story goes like this. Consider Alice’s credences about Bob’s electron.
Her initial credences might be equal to 1/2 for the result of any spin ex-
periment she might perform on Bob’s side. But if she performs first a spin
measurement on her own side — say in direction x with result ‘up’ —, she
will then update her credences about further measurements on Bob’s elec-
tron. In particular she will then believe with all her heart (credence 1) that
if she performs a spin-x experiment on Bob’s electron, this will give the
result ‘down’. What has changed, however, are simply her own credences.
Similarly, Bob has credences about Alice’s electron, which also change in an
analogous manner, but although they are about Alice’s electron, they are his
credences, and (insofar as beliefs can be said to be located anywhere5) they
are in his head. These two autonomous points of view can be then mar-
ried together to form a composite picture of the EPR pair. (Thus, indeed,
bringing out an analogy between qBism and cubism!)
The worry is about this marriage. QBism, just like ‘classical Brunism’,
presupposes that different agents be able to share data, an assumption that
underlies the intersubjective agreement between different agents derivable
from de Finetti’s theorem. Different agents may become aware at different
times of different pieces of data, but they can inspect each others’ data and
pool them together.
Indeed, suppose Alice and Bob both perform spin measurements in direction
x, and then later meet to compare results. From Alice’s point of view, her
asking Bob his result is her own measurement of Bob’s electron (which in
the meantime has interacted with this further system called Bob), and her
own measurement results are timelike related. But if she wishes to take
Bob’s own report seriously as providing her with data that at the time of
his measurement were available to him but not yet to her, then the mystery
of perfectly correlated spacelike separated events returns.6
5Disregarding notions of extended cognition — which are presumably beside the point
here.
6The situation is quite analogous to that of collapse on the forward light cone. If tech-
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Wigner’s friend (another case for which qBism claims to have a ready expla-
nation) can be seen as a variant of the above. Bob performs an experiment
in a lab that is isolated from Alice (perhaps because Alice and Bob are
spacelike separated at the time). Alice can later perform a measurement
on the content of Bob’s lab (either repeating Bob’s measurement or asking
him for a report). If she does repeat Bob’s measurement, the result she
observes coincides with the result of the earlier measurement as reported
by Bob, again suggesting that she should take the report seriously as de-
scribing objective data that were not yet available to her. Unlike the EPR
case, this is not particularly puzzling. But in the Wigner’s friend scenario,
we are invited to consider also the case in which Alice performs instead an
interference experiment on the entire contents of Bob’s lab, and thereby
‘quantum erases’ Bob’s result. In qBist terms, this could be understood
merely as Alice performing some manipulation that leads her to change her
own credences about the results of her asking Bob what he has seen. She
now expects from Bob not some or other report of a definite result, but a
definite report of not having performed the experiment. But this description
misses out on the fact that Alice’s manipulation has in fact obliterated also
Bob’s piece of data and any memory that Bob had of it (unless, that is, we
assume that Bob did not really possess any such piece of data in the first
place).
Thus, if we believe that data obtained by different agents are equally objec-
tive, thus understanding ‘pooling of data’ literally, we have problems. There
are no such problems once the data have been pooled together, but we have
two puzzling cases in situations where Bob’s data are not yet available to
Alice. In the EPR case, qBism remains silent on why Alice and Bob’s data
should be correlated, and in the Wigner’s friend case, it remains silent on
how Alice can erase Bob’s data. The choice for qBists seems to be between:
(a) providing us with a further story about data and/or agents themselves,
rather than just strategies for how agents update their credences in the face
of new data; and (b) some kind of solipsism or radical relativism, in which
we care only about single individuals’ credences, and not about whether and
how they ought to mesh.
nically feasible, a theory in which the collapse of the quantum state takes place along the
forward light cone of a triggering event would be manifestly Lorentz-invariant. However,
in the case of an EPR pair, it would leave unexplained how space-like separated collapses
are correlated so as to match up on the overlap of their future light cones. Cf. e. g. the
discussion in Bacciagaluppi (2010).
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2.2 Hidden constraints on probability assignments
My main worry, however, runs deeper in the conceptual foundations of
qBism. A central idea of qBism is that the view is not a modification of
but an addition to Bayesian coherence. This addition is equally normative,
but rather than being rational in origin, it is empirically motivated. It is
essentially contained in the formula
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1 , (1)
which constrains the relation between probabilities in certain pairs of actual
and counterfactual situations. The actual situation is a measurement of the
family of projections Dj , and the formula compares the probabilities Q(Dj)
with the probabilities
∑d2
i=1 P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) that would have been obtained
if a previous measurement of the ‘fiducial SIC’ with effects Hi had been
performed (a generalisation of this formula holds if the Dj are effects).
7
This is, indeed, a situation on which Bayesian coherence is silent. The law
of total probability
Q(Dj) =
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) (2)
is clearly a prescription for relating the probabilities of two actual measure-
ments.
However, I claim that formula (1) already presupposes very strong con-
straints on our subjective probability assignments. Indeed, the very idea of
well-defined probabilities Q(Dj) for projections (or more generally effects)
Dj already embodies such strong constraints, even before we start compar-
ing our probability assignments for actual measurements to our probability
assignments for counterfactual measurements.
In order to substantiate this claim, let me recall some standard material.
It is nowadays customary in quantum mechanics and quantum information
to describe (general) measurements using the concepts of operations and of
POVM s (positive-operator-valued measures).
7See below for the definition of an effect.
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Operations are families of transformations on the quantum states (thought
of as transformations induced by ‘measurements’). Such transformations
could for instance be of the form (‘pure operation’)
ρ 7→ AiρA
∗
i (3)
(with the right-hand side suitably renormalised), and each such transforma-
tion takes place with probability
Tr(AiρA
∗
i ) = Tr(ρA
∗
iAi) . (4)
For this expression to indeed define a probability distribution over the vari-
ous possible transformations we must have:
∑
i
Di :=
∑
i
A∗iAi = 1 (5)
(with 1 the identity operator). The thus defined operators Di are so-called
effects, i. e. they are positive (self-adjoint with positive spectrum) and with
spectrum contained in the interval [0, 1]. The mapping from the indices i (or
sets thereof) to the associated Di (or sums thereof) is thus an effect-valued
measure, also called positive-operator-valued measure (POVM).
One should note crucially that the probabilities associated with a transfor-
mation are fixed just by the corresponding POVM.
Further, one easily sees that a pure operation such as the above can always
be implemented by coupling the system to an ancillary system,
|ψ〉 ⊗ |ϕ0〉 7→
∑
i
Ai|ψ〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 (6)
for some orthonormal family |ϕi〉, and then collapsing onto the latter. Note
that such coupling is indeed unitary because of (5). (This result, suitably
generalised to all operations, is known as the Naimark dilation theorem.)
Here is a very familiar example.
Example 1 (von Neumann measurement):
Let Ai := |ψi〉〈ψi| for some orthonormal basis. We implement it via
∑
i
αi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕ0〉 7→
∑
i
αi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 , (7)
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and we have
A∗iAi = Pi := |ψi〉〈ψi| , (8)
so the correspondiong POVM is projection-valued.
A von Neumann measurement, however, is not the only experimental pro-
cedure for measuring a projection-valued measure, as the following example
shows.
Example 2 (‘measurement of the second kind’):
Let the |ψi〉 be as above, and let Bi = |ψ
′
i〉〈ψi| for some arbitrary unit vectors
|ψ′i〉. We have ∑
i
αi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕ0〉 7→
∑
i
αi|ψ
′
i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉 . (9)
Note that
B∗iBi = |ψi〉〈ψ
′
i|ψ
′
i〉〈ψi| = Pi , (10)
and the transformation is indeed associated to the same projection-valued
measure as in Example 1. The difference is that the ‘collapsed’ state of the
system after the measurement is no longer an eigenstate of the measured
observable (in the traditional sense of a self-adjoint operator with spectral
measure defined by the Pi). The measurement is not ‘minimally distrurbing’.
How do these examples lead to a worry about qBism? Note that (1) con-
tains probability assignments Q(Dj) referring to measurements of POVMs
irrespective of which transformations are used to implement them. Thus, it
presupposes that we assign the same probabilities to the results of the two
transformations in Examples 1 and 2, even though they correspond to differ-
ent lab procedures. QBism is currently silent on why we have this constraint
on our probability assignments. Of course, we can say it is empirically well-
established, and we can derive it theoretically from the quantum mechanical
theory of measurement if we apply the usual Born rule to the ancillary sys-
tem in the model. But if (1) is meant to be a simple axiom embodying one
of the main modifications of Bayesian coherence theory that are supposed
to lead to quantum mechanics, it appears that it already presupposes a lot
of the structure it is trying to explain.
The point can be made even more strikingly using a further example.
Example 3 (sequential von Neumann measaurements):
Concatenating two operations yields a further operation, e. g.
ρ 7→ PiρPi 7→ QjPiρPiQj . (11)
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Indeed, defining
Aij := QjPi , (12)
we obtain a corresponding POVM:
∑
ij
A∗ijAij =
∑
ij
PiQjPi =
∑
i
Pi = 1 . (13)
This POVM can be measured via two sequential von Neumann measure-
ments. For instance, if the Pi and Qj project onto spin-1/2 eigenstates in
directions x and y, we can implement the composite POVM by letting an
electron pass in sequence two Stern–Gerlach magnets at right angles to each
other (two sequential interactions between the spin and spatial degrees of
freedom of the electron) and then measuring on which quadrant of the screen
the electron impinges.
But we can also implement it using a single interaction with an ancillary
system, e. g. by defining
Bij :=
√
PiQjPi . (14)
Indeed,
B∗ijBij = (
√
PiQjPi)
2 = PiQjPi = A
∗
ijAij , (15)
and the corresponding POVM is the same as in (13).
This is again a case of two totally different laboratory procedures that allow
one to measure the same POVM, this time an effect-valued rather than
projection-valued one.
We can again note that the qBist formula relating the probabilities we assign
to results of (actual) measurements of effect-valued measures to the probabil-
ities in the corresponding counterfactual situations (a fairly straightforward
generalisation of (1)) presupposes that we assign the same probabilities also
to these two procedures.
This presupposition, however, is even more suspect than in the case of Ex-
amples 1 and 2, because the procedure defined by (12) already implicitly
contains the collapse of the state (or at least the effective collapse through
decoherence of the spin state by the spatial degree of freedom along the first
measured direction x), which even more strongly suggests that the strat-
egy currently pursued within qBism for axiomatising and/or understanding
quantum mechanics implicitly presupposes a lot of the structure it is trying
to explain.
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3 Other pragmatist alternatives
Whether or not qBism will turn out to provide a fully successful new frame-
work for understanding quantum mechanics, it has already shattered a
taboo: that of using a subjectivist approach to probabilities in quantum
mechanics. The traditional view of course is that quantum probabilities are
the paradigm of objective probabilities. The idea that a radical subjectivist
approach a` la de Finetti might be applied to the quantum case (which at
least prima facie is truly indeterministic) used to be inconceivable.
The inconceivable having now been conceived, I wish to suggest in this
section that in fact a subjectivist/pragmatist approach to probability can
be applied in the context of just about any approach to quantum mechanics.
In particular, it can be applied also to approaches that adopt an ontic view
of the quantum state. As pointed out in Section 1, an ontic view of the
quantum state might be adopted also within qBism, as long as the quantum
state itself is not seen as a probabilistic entity (although this is not part of
the usual presentations of qBism8). Other approaches to the foundations of
quantum mechanics such as the Bohm theory, GRW theories, or the Everett
theory explicitly take an ontic view of the quantum state (thus at least in
principle also providing an answer to the question of the ontology of data
and agents, cf. above Section 2.1).
I shall now sketch very briefly in turn how each of these can adopt a radical
subjectivist view of probabilities, thus taking the quantum state as ontic
but as non-probabilistic (whether or not it is customary for them to do so!).
3.1 Bohm
It is easiest to think of subjectivism about probabilities in the case of the
Bohm theory. Indeed, the Bohm theory is a deterministic theory, and we are
familiar with applying the classic de Finetti analysis to deterministic cases.
8I cannot resist teasing Chris here by pointing out that pace the remarks in Fuchs
(2010, pp. 24–25), the results of decoherence just scream out for an ontic interpretation of
the quantum state (so much classical-like structure within the quantum state that could
be used to explain the classical world — if only we could avail ourselves to an ontic
interpretation of the state). Cf. Bacciagaluppi (2012, esp. Section 3.5). The quantum-to-
classical transition is here to stay, and qBism ought to incorporate it.
11
The Bohm theory (or de Broglie–Bohm theory, or pilot-wave theory) de-
scribes ‘classical’ configurations evolving deterministically in a way fixed
by the quantum wave function of the total system. The usual statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics are recovered if one assumes that the
configurations in an ensemble are distributed according to the usual quan-
tum mechanical distribution (a condition which is preserved over time). The
situation is very similar to that of classical statistical mechanics (with the
difference that now the ‘equilibrium’ distributions are time-dependent), and
this analogy has been developed in considerable detail.9
Note that the quantum states in the Bohm theory are both ontic and non-
probabilistic. They are the ‘pilot waves’ of the theory. They acquire a prob-
abilistic significance only if we adopt a strategy of choosing our subjective
probabilities to be equal to the modulus squared of the wave function. While
such a strategy is highly successful,10 the quantum wave functions provide
no fundamental constraint on initial positions, nor indeed on particle dis-
tributions in ensembles. This is evident from the fact that non-equilibrium
pilot-wave theory is equally intelligible and may even have very interesting
applications (Valentini 2010).
Just as in the case of the weight distribution of a coin — which turns out
to be a reliable indicator of the statistical behaviour under repeated tossing
only under certain ‘typical’ conditions —, so the wave function describing an
ensemble of particles (more precisely, the so-called effective wave function,
i. e. the component of the wave function responsible for the motion) is a
reliable indicator of the statistical behaviour of the particles only on the
assumption of typicality. Thus in both cases a physical but non-probabilistic
property associated with the system under consideration (and one that can
be modelled theoretically) is used as a pragmatic short-cut for fixing our
subjective probabilities for the behaviour of the system.
9For general references to the Bohm theory, see e. g. Bohm and Hiley (1993), Goldstein
(2013), Holland (1993).
10And can be justified using arguments analogous to those employed in classical statis-
tical mechanics (see e. g. Valentini (1991a,b), Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zangh`ı (1992), Towler,
Russell and Valentini (2011)).
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3.2 GRW
It is less familiar to think in terms of subjective probabilities in the case of
spontaneous collapse theories, i. e. theories in which the Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion is modified in a way that reproduces the phenomenology of collapse.
Such theories were shown to be viable by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986)
and Pearle (1976, 1989), and are thus also know as GRW (or GRWP) theo-
ries.11
Since in GRW theories we have genuine indeterministic evolution of the
quantum state, they are generally thought of in terms of objective collapse
probabilities, much like ‘traditional’ quantum mechanics. However, the idea
that in the case of genuine indeterminism probabilities should be thought
of as objective presupposes that a viable account of objective probabilities
be given, e. g. in terms of frequencies or propensities, and both of these
accounts suffer from more or less severe problems. The third strategy open
to objectivists is to apply Lewis’s (1971) ‘principal principle’, i. e. to argue
that there are compelling rational reasons for adopting a particular recipe to
fix one’s subjective probabilities. Perhaps some version of ‘Humean objective
chances’ can deliver on this, but the step to subjectivism might be very short
in that case.12
The quantum state in GRW theories is clearly ontic, indeed at least prima
facie provides the ‘stuff’ the world is made of.13 But as regards the prob-
abilistic evolution of the state, we can adopt de Finetti’s position, holding
that there are no right or wrong probabilities about how the state evolves.
We can take the GRW theory (a theoretical model of these probabilities) as
a pragmatic recipe for fixing our subjective probabilities for the dynamical
behaviour of the states (much as we take weight distributions to guide our
expectations about the behaviour of tossed coins). And we can push the line
that de Finetti’s position is not only tenable in an indeterministic context,
but that it may be even less artificial than others in the context of GRW
theories.
11For an accessible reference, see Ghirardi (2011).
12On Humean objective chances, see e. g. Hoefer (2007), and for their application to
GRW and for more general discussion of objective probabilities in GRW, see Frigg and
Hoefer (2007).
13There is a debate about the most natural interpretation of spontaneous collapse the-
ories: whether — in increasing order of resilience against the so-called ‘tails’ problem —
it is in terms of wave functions, matter density, or collapse events (so-called ‘flashes’ or
‘hits’). For details see e. g. Ghirardi (2000), Allori et al. (2008), Bacciagaluppi (2010).
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3.3 Everett
The final and most interesting case is that of Everett.14 As is well known,
Everett takes the wave function of the universe seriously as providing the
ontology of the theory, and the Schro¨dinger equation as providing its dynam-
ics. Collapse is explained through the correlational structure of the universal
wave function, whereby the quantum state appears to collapse to an internal
observer (or whatever other system is ‘recording’ collapse events). Each out-
come of a collapse is equally real, relative to the corresponding component
of the observer.
Modern-day Everettians refine Everett’s original analysis of the correlational
structure of the universal wave function through the use of decoherence
theory (cf. e. g. Wallace (2010a), Bacciagaluppi (2012)). However, there
is a generalised perception of a problem in making sense of probabilities
in the Everett theory, precisely because, say, in the context of a sequence
of measurements on an ensemble of systems, all sequences of outcomes are
actualised (in different ‘worlds’ or ‘branches’ of the universal wave function).
Thus, not only are there no right or wrong probabilities, but probabilities
would appear to make no sense at all (at least in the sense that we do not
seem to be ignorant of what will be the outcome of a measurement15).
A breakthrough on this question was achieved not many years ago by David
Deutsch (1999) and David Wallace (2007, 2010b), who adopted the Lewisian
strategy sketched above and argued, first, that rational decision theory can
be applied to the case of an Everettian agent located before a branching
event (see also Greaves (2004) and Greaves and Myrvold (2010)), and, cru-
cially, that rationality constraints on such an agent will force them to adopt
the quantum probabilities for the results of the branching. Thus, quantum
probabilities (at least insofar as they apply to such a decision-theoretic sit-
uation) are objective chances in the sense of Lewis. The approach based on
the Deutsch–Wallace theorem appears to command quite a consensus among
14Cf. also my comments in Bacciagaluppi (2013), which reviews the state-of-the-art
volume on the Everett theory edited by Saunders et al. (2010). Everett’s complete writ-
ings on quantum mechanics, together with a wealth of other original material, have been
published and annotated by Barrett and Byrne (2012).
15Note that, as clearly shown by Vaidman (1996), we do have ignorance of the result
of a measurement at least after the measurement has occurred and we are not yet aware
of the result. After the branching induced by a measurement there is a genuine question
about self-location.
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modern Everettians, but has also been the object of strong criticism.16
I wish to suggest that Everettians can avail themselves of an alternative sub-
jectivist strategy, taking ‘branch weights’ as guides for navigating a branch-
ing universe. The choice of branch weight as quantifying probability (or ‘typ-
icality’) can be pragmatically justified on the basis that it has performed well
in the past, and on the basis of its being the ‘natural’ measure on branches,
e. g. because of Gleason’s (1957) theorem or the Deutsch–Wallace theorem
(this is Greaves and Myrvold’s (2010) take on the latter), or because it is
conserved by the dynamics analogously to the measure in classical statis-
tical mechanics (this is in fact the justification proposed by Everett (see
e. g. Barrett and Byrne 2012, pp. 274–275)). This reading of probability in
Everett needs of course to be developed further, but would provide a par-
ticularly striking way of combining an ontic view of the quantum state with
a subjectivist view of quantum probability.17
Such an application of ‘Brunism’ to the quantum case would of course be
much tamer than Chris Fuchs’s usual emphasis on quantum states them-
selves being subjective. Stretching the metaphor, if we allow Everett’s uni-
versal wave function to explain what agents and outcomes are in the first
place, the heroic phase of ‘analytical qBism’ will give way to a much tamer
‘synthetic qBism’. That said — returning to the history of art — I have
always preferred the analytic phase of cubism to the synthetic one!
16For a lively and representative sample of the literature, see the relevant contributions
by Albert, Greaves and Myrvold, Kent, Price, Saunders, and Wallace, as well as the
transcripts of the discussions, in Saunders et al. (2010). In particular, Price (2010) argues
that agents may have global reasons on which to base their decisions, i. e. reasons other than
the utilities of their successors. Such arguments of course undermine the idea that there
should be compelling rational arguments for adopting the usual quantum probabilities in
Everett.
17In further work, in particular with my graduate students, I hope to elaborate both
on the analogy between Everett’s view of probability in his own theory and in classical
statistical mechanics — in particular on how it allows one to make statistical inferences
in an Everettian universe —, and on the pragmatist reading of typicality, both in Everett
and in classical statistical mechanics.
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